The US Supreme Court typically sits en banc. By contrast, it is unprecedented for the House of Lords in the UK to sit en banc; instead, its twelve members are assigned to fixed panels of five to hear the vast majority of appeals. The Supreme Court of Canada, which has nine members like the US Supreme Court, routinely sits in panels of five, seven, or nine justices, depending on the appeal; about half of the appeals are heard by panels of seven justices. This variation in high court practices gives rise to a puzzle. Is a fixed panel size optimal or is there some reason to prefer a system which allows panel size to vary? If panel size ought to be fixed, is the largest possible panel size generally preferable? Should a panel that is a subset of the court's members be deployed, or is sitting en banc better? In this paper, we develop a formal model of the optimal choice of panel size. The model suggests that in the presence of scarce judicial resources, panel sizes can be deliberately adjusted to improve allocational efficiency. Using data from more than 2000 appeals decided by the Supreme Court of Canada from 1984-2005, we show that the Court appears to be using varied panel sizes in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model.
I Introduction
How many judges should sit on a case heard by a multimember appellate court? Panel size of appellate courts varies across and within counties. The nine-member United States Supreme
Court typically sits en banc. The twelve-member UK House of Lords almost always sits in panels of five. Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Canada, composed of nine justices like the US Supreme Court, routinely sits in panels of five, seven, or nine justices. This variation in high court practices gives rise to a puzzle. Is a fixed panel size optimal or are there reasons to prefer a system which allows panel size to vary? If panel size ought to be fixed, is sitting en banc in the largest possible panel size generally preferable, or should a panel that is a subset of the court's members be deployed?
Recent commentary has turned to analyzing these questions. Guthrie and George, for example, have recently argued that the United States Supreme Court practice should not be viewed as immutable and that it should begin to hear cases in panels of three judges with only discretionary en banc review for very important cases. 1 In this paper, we develop a formal model of the optimal choice of panel size. The model suggests that in the presence of scarce judicial resources, panel sizes can be deliberately adjusted to improve allocational efficiency. Using data from more than 2000 appeals decided by the Supreme Court of Canada from 1984-2005, we show that the Court appears to be using varied panel sizes in a manner consistent with the predictions of our model.
Suppose a nine-member court is faced with two cases, one very difficult and one very easy to decide "correctly," abstracting from the question of what makes a decision -correct.‖ What is the best panel size for each case? At first glance, it is tempting to argue that larger panels will tend to be more accurate, and therefore that a panel size of nine ought to be preferred for the very hard case and a panel size of five for the very easy case. However, we argue that in fact in both types of cases a smaller panel size is preferable. There is a cost to assigning a justice to a particular case, and only in cases of intermediate difficulty is a larger panel size worth the additional cost.
Previous studies of the optimal size or structure of the court system for achieving accuracy have typically focused on one of two approaches. First, some studies have relied on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) to argue for empanelling more judges on the basis that additional judges will improve the accuracy of decisions. 2 In general terms, the CJT holds that if a decision has to be made between two choices, one correct and one incorrect, if all those who vote on the decision are more likely than not to make the correct choice and the vote of each is independently made, then the probability that the majority of voters will make the correct choice increases and approaches one as the number of voters increases.
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In one of these studies, Kornhauser and Sager apply the CJT to multimember courts. 4 They assume initially that decisions have two possible outcomes, and that the judges (i) decide independently; (ii) are identically likely to choose the correct outcome; and (iii) are more likely than not to choose the correct outcome. They also stipulate that the decision is made according to a simple majority voting rule. They argue that, under these conditions, adding judges to a decision increases the likelihood of an accurate decision. Moreover, they state that this result holds even if the judges have different probabilities of choosing the correct outcome and even if there are more than two possible outcomes. Abramowicz derives a similar conclusion using CJT to discuss the accuracy of a court's decisions, in this case in the context of en banc decisions of the twelve regional circuits of the US Court of Appeals. 5 He views a decision as -correct‖ if a majority of the regional circuits would decide the appeal in that fashion. Abramowicz argues that as panel size increases, it is more likely that the panel will reach this -correct‖ decision.
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A second line of literature seeks to incorporate the costs of appeal for determining the optimal structure of the court system. For example, Shavell has examined the role of the appellate structure in minimizing the social costs of trials. 7 These costs include both the private and public costs of litigating and the social harm from an incorrect decision. He attempts to determine the optimal level of resources given this goal. Shavell concludes that the appeals process can be justified as a means of error correction: not only are appeals that are heard more 2 See, for example, L. Kornhauser and L. Sager, -Unpacking the Court‖ (1986) likely to result in the correct outcome, but litigants are more likely to appeal incorrect than correct decisions.
In a related paper, Kornhauser examines the structure of the court system given fixed resources. 8 He focuses on the issue of precedent within a hierarchical court structure, viewing the judges as a team in which all judges seek the same end of maximizing the number of correct decisions. Kornhauser concludes that, given constrained resources, there is a role for both vertical precedents (that is, lower courts adhering to decisions of appellate courts) and horizontal precedents at the appellate level. The intuition behind the result is that there are benefits to appellate courts of following precedent: (i) the resources of the court are preserved (the court can learn from its past decisions and decisions of higher courts); and (ii) the results of an appeal become more predictable for the parties, increasing the chances of efficient settlement (the parties can infer the likely appellate outcome from past decisions).
More recently, Clark and Strauss examined the issue of allocation of resources on high courts and, in particular, the docket control exercised by high courts. 9 They take into account the level of effort judges apply to hearing cases, the difficulty of reaching correct decisions, and the quality of lower courts. They find that imposing a minimum effort for each case (that is, requiring the court to hear all cases but allowing the effort to be very low) results in a more even distribution of effort across cases than if the court could control its own docket, but that the additional effort on the cases the court would not have heard comes at the cost of reduced effort on the more difficult cases. They also examine conditions under which judges will shirk, concluding that in courts where there is insignificant weight placed on unallocated judicial resources, requiring judges to expend a minimal level of effort can improve legal efficiency. resources to decide cases (including potentially greater expertise), they argue that smaller panels have other -process‖ advantages (such as greater cooperation). 12 In order to obtain the benefits of larger panels when needed, they also propose that the Court retain the discretion to hear very important appeals en banc.
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This paper seeks to draw together these lines of literature to examine optimal panel size in a multimember appellate court. 14 We treat the choice of panel size on a particular appeal as an exercise in constrained optimization. Our paper is different from the error correction literature in that neither Shavell nor Kornhauser focuses explicitly on a collegial court in which more than one judge sits on a particular case. And our paper is different from the CJT analysis in that we recognize the opportunity costs associated with adding judges to a panel. This paper considers resource allocation in the context of a multimember collegial court. 15 The focus on the collegial court illuminates a relationship between the accuracy of the decision based on the CJT and the resource constraints facing the court. 16 Our paper is related to that of Clark and Strauss in that we 12 George and Guthrie (2008) , supra note 1, at 1845-7; and George and Guthrie (2009), supra note 1, qt 1472-4. 13 George and Guthrie (2009), supra note 1, at 1467-8. 14 Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 2, argue that there are other (though related) factors than accuracy that should be considered including fit, reliability, authenticity and appearance. 15 Edelman, supra note 3, at 342-3 notes that there may be a relevant trade-off of accuracy and cost in the context of accuracy, stating that -if we believe that the aggregation model [underlying the CJT] applies to multimember courts, then it is perfectly reasonable to assume that all appellate panels should have the same number of judges. We could argue that there is some trade-off between accuracy and the administrative burden of a large panel, and these tradeoffs would remain the same regardless of the number of judges in the circuit.‖ He argues that in other models under the CJT the size of the panel may differ depending on other factors such as the size of the group whose preferences the court's decision is attempting to mirror. Abramowicz, supra note 5, also refers briefly to a possible trade-off between increasing the number of judges hearing a case and some notion of opportunity cost but does not develop this concept (at 1633). 16 There may be other reasons why a Chief Justice may alter the size or composition of a panel. She may wish, for example, to have more judges on a panel if a greater number of justices increases the influence of a decision. In contrast to the accuracy and influence explanations which are primarily efficiency based, there is also a potential ideological story behind the choice of panel size and composition. There is a large and growing literature examining whether justices vote in particular cases in line with their own personal policy preferences. For a discussion of these models in the US context, see J. 
II Optimizing Panel Size
In this Part, we model the choice of panel size on a nine member court and isolate the factors that ought to influence this decision. We show that all else the same the more important the case, the greater the number of judges that should sit on the panel. In addition, the lower the cost of Our second assumption is that each judge reaches an independent conclusion about each appeal he or she hears. That is, we set aside the role of joint deliberation. We also set aside specialization and assume that each judge on the appellate body has the same probability, p, of coming to the correct decision on a matter. The independent conclusions of each judge are aggregated into a single decision by a majority voting rule.
The probability of each judge reaching a correct decision is equal across judges, but is not necessarily equal across cases. In particular, we assume that deciding correctly varies in likelihood across cases, ranging from relatively easy cases with p approaching 1, to very difficult cases with p just greater than 0.5. We also assume that judges know the probability that they are correct in any given case, which bounds p from below at 0.5.
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Third, we assume that there is a cost, K, from assigning a judge to a panel. This cost can be thought of as the effort costs of each judge having to sit on a particular case. Alternatively, 19 See, for example, L. Kornhauser, supra note 8, (examining optimal judicial structure and abstracting from a definition of -correct‖, arguing that it is irrelevant for his economic analysis and could mean the welfare maximizing decision, the decision which satisfies corrective justice or some other notion of correctness) and L. Kornhauser, -Modelling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependence‖ (1992) 12 International Review of Law and Economics 169 (arguing that on appeal, most legal decisions are dichotomous; i.e., have a yes or no answer)). 20 Shavell, supra note 7, investigates the efficiency of appellate decision-making generally and makes a similar assumption. 21 This could be regarded as a gain of αB if the decision is correct and (1-α)B if incorrect, with 0<α<1. 22 See also Clark and Strauss, supra note 9, discussing the difficulty of a decision. However, Clark and Strauss do not do so in the context of Condorcet Jury Theory. Moreover, our assumption of independence also applies across levels of courts -that is, the decision of a lower court does not affect the decision-making of the upper level court. Clark and Strauss, on the other hand, assume that a high quality lower court decision can make the appellate decision less difficult. Finally, Clark and Strauss appear to include a notion of social benefit in their measure of difficulty of deciding a case whereas we separate out these factors.
the cost can be understood to capture some opportunity cost from having a judge sit on this case, in that there are fewer judicial resources available to sit on other cases. Under this conception, any decision to assign judges to a particular panel should be undertaken in light of the full range of cases that could be heard in a given time period. This is not in practice how the court assigns appeals to panels. Since applications for leave are made over time, the practice is in actual operation a rolling process. It is thus not unreasonable to fix the opportunity cost at some expected loss, K, which can be regarded as capturing the expected lost social benefits from assigning a judge to this case and thus potentially not hearing a different case. 23 In the model we abstract from private costs of the appeal.
The benefit from the Supreme Court hearing an appeal depends on the probability that the standing decision of the lower court is correct. Let this probability be q. Setting aside the costs of the appeal, the benefit from hearing an appeal will be positive where the Supreme Court reverses an incorrect decision and negative where it reverses a correct decision. Let the probability of the Supreme Court panel being correct be P=P(n), where n is the number of panellists. In this case, the net benefit of the appeal, including the costs of the panel is:
As the expression for V(n) suggests, there are two competing effects from adding panellists: the probability of making the correct decision, P(n), increases, while the cost of the decision, nK, also increases. P(n) increases in n consistently with the Condorcet Jury Theorem:
if each juror has a better than even chance of being correct, then the probability that a jury reaches a correct decision by majority vote increases with the number of jurors. The intuition is straightforward. Given that each juror is more likely right than wrong, the more jurors there are, the smaller the chance that a majority of them will get the answer wrong.
Maximizing the value of the appeal with respect to the choice of n, the first order
. The planner should choose n such that the marginal benefit of increasing n,
However, the choice of panel size is constrained on a nine person court. For example, in Canada, the Chief Justice faces discontinuities in her choices: she can only assign five, seven, or 23 Clark and Strauss. ibid, also use a measure of effort and allow for possible shirking by justices who gain utility from leisure activities where they have not used the maximum amount of effort in deciding cases in any period.
nine justices to a case. Thus, in seeking to maximize value in such an institutional setting, a social planner deciding whether to assign five, seven, or nine judges to a panel would seek to choose n to maximize V(n) where ) 9 , 7 , 5 ( n . Moving from five to seven judges is efficient if,
Moving from five to seven judges is efficient if the probabilistic improvement in accuracy multiplied by the benefits of accuracy exceed the costs of assigning two additional judges to the case.
The expression for P (7) is,
, while the expression for P(5) is,
Two of the factors that contribute to the condition, 0 ) 5 , 7 ( V , being met are clear and
. The greater the social benefit from a correct decision relative to an incorrect decision, B, the more likely is it that seven judges are better than five. This is obvious: the more important the decision, all things equal, the greater the value in getting the answer correct. Second,
. The greater the costs of adding a judge, the less likely is it that seven judges are better than five. At the limit, if adding a judge were costless, for example, there are no other cases that the judge could possibly hear, seven judges would always be better than five.
The less obvious factor concerns the probability that each judge will decide the case
correctly. An increase in the probability that each judge decides correctly may or may not make seven judges more likely to be preferable to five. Consider the full expression, The intuition for the result perhaps becomes clearer after revisiting an interpretation of p advanced above. Think of p as a metric for the difficulty in deciding a case. Very difficult cases entail a lower p: each judge faces a lower probability of reaching the correct result. Easy cases, in contrast, entail a p for each judge that is closer to 1. The result that increasing p may or may not make empanelling additional judges optimal can be understood in light of this interpretation of p. When cases are very easy, the probability that each judge will reach the correct result is high, which in turn implies that adding new judges does not add much in the way of accuracy; even a small panel is highly likely to be correct. At the limit, where p=1, adding more judges adds nothing to accuracy, but simply adds costs. That is, where p=1,
But adding judges is also not useful at the other extreme where p=0.5. If the case is so difficult to judge that a coin toss is as good as a judge, then adding judges also does not increase accuracy-the probability of a majority of heads in coin tosses is the same after five or seven flips. Where p=0.5,
. More generally, the more difficult the case, the lower is p, and the lower the increase in accuracy from adding judges to the panel.
Analogous analysis can be applied to the question of moving from 7 to 9 judges. Adding judges to panels considering very difficult or very easy appeals is not optimal, all other things equal. Judges should be added to panels considering appeals of intermediate difficulty.
The next section explores some of the empirical implications of the theory within the institutional framework of the Supreme Court of Canada, but we note here that the analysis has some broader implications for the appellate process. First, an application of the analysis concerns a court's approach to overturning its own past decisions. Many courts have a practice of appointing more judges to hear cases where a standing precedent of the court is in jeopardy of being overturned. US Circuit Courts of Appeal are more likely to sit en banc in such cases, for example. 24 The analysis here suggests that this may be inappropriate. Whether a case might 24 In some circuits, such as the 8 th , this practice is established by convention: see, Brown v. First Nat'l Bank, 844 F.2d 580, 582 (8th Cir. 1988) . In other circuits, such as the 6 th circuit and the Federal circuit, it is prescribed by court rules. Apparently, the practice is common, but is not perfectly uniform across the circuits. See Polly J. Price, -Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding‖ (2000) 42 B.C. L. Rev. 81 at fn. 24. See also George and overturn precedent or not is unrelated to the opportunity cost of a judicial time, K. It is also not obvious why overturning precedent is more likely to involve relatively important cases, though there is some reason to suspect such a correlation: incorrect precedent that is not very harmful socially may be less likely to be the subject of litigation than incorrect precedent that is harmful.
In addition, there may be system-wide importance from overturning precedent in that it may marginally reduce certainty among potential litigants about other precedents. For these reasons a case potentially overturning a precedent may be systematically more important and thus worthy of being heard by a greater number of judges.
On the other hand, if a decision has gone one way in the past, but a current court is contemplating overturning that precedent, it is reasonable to assume that the question is a very difficult one to answer. This prior is even stronger if, as is often the case when courts consider setting aside precedent, the previous case resulted in a divided court. This assumption may not hold where the motivation for a rehearing turns on new information, but if the contemplated overturning simply reflects judicial unease with precedent, it is reasonable to assume that the case is relatively difficult. As we have seen, there may be limited value from adding judges to a panel considering a very difficult case. Hence, it is not obvious that courts revisiting past authority should necessarily sit with a larger panel.
Second, the analysis has implications for the prior question of whether leave to appeal should be granted in any given case. In essence, an appeal allows a legal problem to be scrutinized by another set of judicial eyes. Clearly, the investment in judicial time is more worthwhile the more important the case, and the lower the opportunity cost of the judges' time.
But the difficulty of the case is ambiguous. Very easy cases, all things equal, should be less likely to get leave given that additional scrutiny is unlikely to yield a significant increase in the probability of a correct result. Perhaps less intuitively, the above analysis suggests that very difficult cases should also be less likely, all things equal, to get leave: further scrutiny is not likely to have a large impact on the probability of a correct result. 25 It is further scrutiny of cases of intermediate difficulty that is most likely to have a significant impact on the probability of a correct decision. On an analogous note, waiting to grant leave to consider a matter only after it Guthrie (2009) , supra note 1, at 1467 (arguing that if the US Supreme Court hears cases in panels of three, it should retain the discretion to hear some cases en banc including appeals in which it would overturn precedent). 25 But see Clark and Strauss, supra note 9 (arguing that if the case is more difficult, the Supreme Court will want to hear it).
has been litigated more than once makes more sense for cases of intermediate difficulty than for very easy or very difficult cases.
There are several caveats to our analysis that follow from the assumptions underlying the model. First, we have assumed that all judges have the same expertise on a given question. This is unlikely to hold true in practice, which in turn implies that sometimes a specific panel of fewer judges rather than a panel with a greater number of different judges will lead to more accurate decision-making. If, for example, one judge has a probability of close to 1 of getting a decision correct, while all eight others have a 50/50 chance of correctness, then a panel of five with the expert is more likely to get it right than a panel of seven that excludes the expert. In such contexts, appointing fewer judges will lead to greater accuracy and smaller judicial opportunity costs.
Second, deliberation affects the analysis. The effects of deliberation on the optimality of panel size are ambiguous. Certain kinds of deliberation call for fewer judges, all things equal.
For example, suppose that one judge tends to be consistently persuaded by another. Having both on the same panel does not add to accuracy relative to one, since in effect there is only one decision that affects both votes. On other hand, other kinds of deliberations call for more judges.
Suppose that each judge has some probability of thinking of some insight that when shared with other judges is not decisive, but increases other judges' probability of reaching the correct outcome. This kind of deliberation increases the benefits of more judges. Thus, while we set aside deliberation in our basic model, there is no doubt that the nature of deliberations might affect the optimal panel size.
Third, we have set aside political preferences, but such considerations, if important in practice, would have a significant impact on the analysis. For example, the optimal panel would seek to neutralize political biases that negatively affect the probability of an accurate decision. Fifth, and related to the previous caveat, we have assumed that the time spent on an appeal does not affect the probability of a judge deciding the appeal correctly. That is, K is fixed, all appeals take the same amount of time, and p is fixed with respect to each appeal.
In summary, we recognize that we make a number of simplifying assumptions that, when relaxed, may affect the policy conclusions we draw. But to the extent that our basic model captures important elements of the panel assignment decision, we can generate testable hypotheses about the choice of panel size in the Supreme Court of Canada. We turn now to our empirical analysis. 
III Institutional Features of the Supreme Court of Canada

IV Has the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada Chosen Panel Size Efficiently?
The model presented in Part II suggests a number of hypotheses. We focus on two variables that influence optimal panel size in our model: case difficulty (p) and case importance (B). With respect to difficulty, all else the same (i.e., holding B constant), we would expect to see very difficult or very easy appeals (i.e., those with p around 0.5 or 1) assigned to panels of five judges. Cases of intermediate difficulty, all else the same, would tend to be assigned to panels of either seven or nine judges. With respect to importance, holding constant the difficulty of reaching the correct outcome in a given appeal (i.e., fixing p), the more socially valuable it is that a particular appeal is decided correctly, the greater should be the number of justices assigned to hear the appeal. Correspondingly, and all else the same, we would expect that less important Table 3, below. 34 Motions, applications and interventions were not included. This information was retrieved from the Supreme Court Reports and the LexUM website, courtesy of the University of Montreal's Faculty of Law. Judgments that result from two appeals were indexed as one case, just as they are published. This dataset has been subject to random sampling and has been found to be reliable. However, this dataset is not guaranteed to be error free. Upon duplication, anomalies are most likely to arise in the categorization of Type of Appellant, Respondent and Detailed Coding. For more information on the manner of coding the decisions, please contact the authors. 35 The treatment of each case was divided into three categories: appeal allowed; appeal dismissed; and mixed and appeal allowed in part. Where possible, references were sorted into one of these three categories. However those references which were only reference questions and did not fall into one of the above categories were coded as being references.
Supreme Court Reports,
36 for an average of 95 appeals each year. As reported in Table 1 , of these appeals, 477 were assigned to panels of five, 956 were assigned to panels of seven, and 576
were assigned to panels of nine. The cases that are heard as of right are predictably less important than cases heard with leave.
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To be heard -with leave,‖ a case must be determined to be of national importance; in contrast, there is no importance threshold for cases heard -as of right‖ pursuant to s.691 of the Criminal Code. While some percentage of appeals heard as of right might otherwise have been granted leave, the proportion would be significantly less than one assuming that the overall leavegranting rate in applications of leave to appeal of 10-15% is indicative. On average, then, cases heard as of right are less important than those heard with leave. The prediction that follows from this observation regarding the diminished importance of appeals as of right and our model above is that appeals of right should be heard in smaller panels on average than appeals with leave. While almost half of appeals that are heard as of right are decided by panels of five, only 15% of those heard with leave are decided by such small panels. Conversely, while only 17% of appeals as of right are heard by nine justices, a third of appeals with leave are assigned panels of nine. It appears that, consistent with our predictions, more important cases are heard by more judges.
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We adopt the following approach to analyze the relationship between the difficulty of an appeal and panel sizes. Our model of judicial decision-making generates predictions about the distribution of voting outcomes contingent on the difficulty of the case. At a basic level, very easy cases are more likely to be unanimous, while more difficult cases are more likely to have split decisions. To offer a stylized example that conveys the more general idea, suppose there are two judges deciding a case with each having probability p of getting the answer correct. If p=1, the probability of a 2-0 decision is 1; if p=0.5, the probability of a 2-0 decision is only 0.5.
More generally, one may determine the probability of each voting outcome for each panel size contingent on p. For panels of five, for example, there are three possibilities: 5-0; 4-1; or 3-2. A 5-0 decision arises if all judges get the case right, or if they all get it wrong. The probability of 5-0 is thus given by the number of panel configurations that result in all choosing correctly (1) times the probability of such an outcome, 5 p , plus the number of panel configurations that result in all choosing incorrectly (1) times the probability of such an outcome, 5 ) 1 ( p . The probability of a 4-1 result is the number of panel configurations that result in 4 choosing correctly and 1 choosing incorrectly (5 choose 4=5) times the probability of such an 38 Further evidence that more important appeals have tended to be heard by larger panels is that appeals arising from Quebec whose judgments cite the Civil Code of Quebec (a total of 87 cases out of the population) were assigned to panels of five 32% of the time, panels of seven 53% of the time, and panels of nine 15% of the time. Because these cases involve, at least in part, legal issues that are particular to a single Province, it is more likely that, all else the same, they are of lower importance . Analogously, the probability of a 3-2 outcome is
A similar exercise can be conducted for panels of seven and nine to generate predictions for each possible outcome in those cases.
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It is possible, then, to generate predicted distributions for decision outcomes that depend on the probability that each judge is correct.
This in turn allows maximum likelihood estimation of the parameter p for a group of cases. In essence, our maximum likelihood estimation methodology experiments with various values of p given the assumed distributions (developed above in the case of five judges) to determine which value best fits the data.
Before elaborating the tests we use, Table 3 summarizes the data on which we rely.
case is an observation that can be used to infer p. Such an assumption sits somewhat uncomfortably with the theory above. Recall that efficiency calls for very easy and very difficult cases to be assigned to smaller panels. In the context of the SCC, this would imply that very low p cases and very high p cases ought to be assigned to panels of five, which in turn implies that an assumption of uniform p's for panels of five may be inappropriate. We avoid this incoherence by assuming, for the moment, that Supreme Court judges are sufficiently well-equipped to decide correctly with likelihood, p, of greater than 0.69 for every case. This assumption that p is bounded from below at 0.69 suggests that all appeals that are easier (with a p closer to 1) should have fewer rather than more judges. That is, we assume that the judges have a value of p of between 0.69 and 1 for each appeal, and that the harder cases within this group should be heard by larger panels. There is an additional assumption that importance, B, is equal across cases, and thus that panel size is assigned only on the basis of case difficulty. This assumption probably does not hold in reality; we explore this point in greater detail below.
These assumptions render more acute a problem we confront with empirical testing of our theory: there is an unavoidable double-hypothesis problem. We have hypotheses about panel assignments that we seek to test, but in order to do so must rely on hypotheses about models of judicial behaviour. For this first test, we assume the Condorcet model of judging, and that cases are all of similar importance and relatively easy for the judges; our results are inescapably contingent on these premises.
With these caveats stated, the results are as follows: Table 4 , it is apparent that the Supreme Court hears cases in a manner that is consistent with the efficiency analysis. The estimates of p descend as panel size increases, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the Court would assign more judges to cases of greater difficulty. Moreover, these estimates are statistically significantly different from one another.
We have included an unconventional 55.3% confidence interval in order to test the differences in the estimates: if the lower bound of such a confidence interval associated with a higher estimate of p is greater than the upper bound of a lower estimate of p, then the estimates are statistically significantly different from one another at a 95% confidence level. Not only are the estimates of p descending with panel size, the estimates for panels of five, seven, and nine are statistically significantly different from one another at a 95% confidence level. Indeed, given that there is no overlap of the 95% confidence intervals, the estimates are different from one another at greater than a 99% confidence level. This is consistent with efficient panel assignment.
It is instructive for two reasons also to estimate p for each panel size excluding unanimous decisions. First, as noted above, we imposed an assumption of a constant p for each panel size, but this may be inappropriate for panels of 5 if there are some cases in which p is closer to 0.5 and others where p is closer to 1. Panels of five may have both very difficult and easy cases, and eliminating unanimous cases will disproportionately eliminate the easy cases.
Thus, if the group of appeals heard by panels of five includes very easy and very difficult cases, the prediction would be that eliminating unanimous cases would leave the estimated p for the remaining sample lower than the larger panel sizes, which would decide cases of intermediate difficulty. In short, eliminating unanimous cases mitigates the concerns raised by imposing constant p across cases for a given panel size.
The second reason to estimate p after eliminating unanimous cases is that there may be something significant about unanimity that our model of judicial behaviour does not capture. As Table 3 suggests, unanimity may arise more frequently than a pure voting model would predict.
For example, in order to generate a predicted unanimity rate of 66%, matching the actual rates for panels of nine in Table 3 , the probability of correctness for each judge would have to be around 95.5%. While this is possible, such a probability would in turn imply the chances of a 5 to 4 decision to be only 0.043%, yet 10% of cases had 5 to 4 outcomes. We suspect that there is a pull to unanimity for a variety of possible reasons. First, collegial judges may wish to achieve consensus and avoid disagreements, perhaps to strengthen the precedential value of a judgment.
Second, judges may through deliberation persuade one another of the correctness of their positions, something not captured by a pure voting model. Finally, and probably least importantly, lazy judges may wish to avoid dissenting and thus having to write an extra opinion.
One might well object that excluding the panels that reached unanimity of result (though not necessarily reasons) from the analysis (i.e., the 5-0, 7-0, and 9-0 outcomes) artificially and arbitrarily eliminates some of the data. While this is a fair objection to some extent, there are some good reasons to suspect that unanimously decided appeals are different in kind from other appeals. Because this is only imperfectly true (i.e., not all unanimous panels exhibit the features that distinguish them from the assumptions of our model), any analysis systematically including or excluding unanimous panels from the analysis will be problematic. Without an ability to distinguish the features of unanimously decided appeals that are appropriately excluded from those that ought to be included, we confront this issue by both including and excluding unanimous appeals and reporting the results. The estimated p for panels of five eliminating unanimous decisions is indeed lower than that for panels of seven and nine. When all cases are included, p is higher for panels of five than other panels; when unanimous cases are excluded, p is lower for panels of five than other panels. This is consistent with very easy (and disproportionately unanimous cases) being assigned to panels of five, as well as very difficult cases being assigned to panels of five. This is also consistent with our efficiency analysis since the marginal benefit of additional judges is low both when cases are very easy and when they are very difficult. As Table 5 also shows, however, the differences among the estimates of p for different sizes of panels are not consistently statistically significant. The difference between the p estimate for panels of five and seven is statistically significant: the panel of five estimate of p is lower than that for the panel of seven. Other differences are not statistically significant, which reduces our confidence in drawing efficiency inferences from the other comparisons.
41 40 Eliminating unanimous panels of five results in the estimated p appearing to be lower than it is for panels of seven and nine. With respect to panels of five and seven, this difference is statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. We are able to rule out appeals involving the Civil Code of Quebec being a decisive factor in reaching this result because of the small number of such appeals. As reported in the last column of the first table in the Appendix, there were only two split panels of five (one 4-1, and one 3-2) involving the Civil Code of Quebec, out of the total of 65 split panels of five. Such cases also made up a small proportion of the split panels of seven (16 out of the 232 involved Civil Code of Quebec cases) and the split panels of nine (just two out of 193 were Civil Code of Quebec cases). 41 We also estimated results for (i) appeals heard as of right, excluding unanimous decisions; and (ii) appeals heard with leave, excluding unanimous decisions. Although the numbers of appeals heard as of right that were not
We can take the analysis a step further by attempting better to control for the importance of cases. Tables 4 and 5 hold importance constant across cases, which is unrealistic. To assess better whether our estimates of p are affected by variance in case importance, we refine the analysis. To do so, we further divide appeals according to whether the appeal was heard by the Court (i) as of right; and (ii) with leave. For the reasons outlined above relating to appeals as of right not necessarily being appeals involving issues of national importance, we expect that appeals heard as of right should be systematically less important than appeals explicitly granted leave by the Court. 42 While we cannot eliminate variation in case importance by partitioning the samples this way, we can reduce the variation in importance and thus better focus on the effect of variation in difficulty across cases. Tables 6 and 7 present, respectively, the results from (i) appeals heard as of right only;
and (ii) appeals heard with leave only: Dividing the samples on the rough measure of importance provided by noting their provenance does not affect the basic results reported in Table 4 . Indeed, the findings are consistent with those reported in Table 4 , as illustrated in the following graphic.
unanimous were too small to reach meaningful conclusions, the number of such appeals heard with leave revealed the same pattern as that reported above. For the full set of results, see the Appendix. 42 See also Ostberg and Wetstein, supra note 16 at 71, 117 and 155, who examine panel size by type of case and find that over the period [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] , panel size for all cases was 6.9, for civil liberties cases was 7.7, criminal cases was 6.9 and economic cases was 6.7. They argue that this increased panel size for civil liberties cases is consistent with these cases having greater national importance than average.
This lends some additional confidence that the findings reported for all the appeals considered together are robust. Panels of five have a higher estimated p than panels of seven, which in turn have a higher p than panels of nine. These differences are all statistically significant at (at least) a 95% confidence level.
V Conclusion
Appellate courts are under considerable pressure. They must choose from and decide a range of cases in the face of often significant resource constraints. We develop a model which seeks to explain one aspect of how a court may deal with these pressures-varying the panel size to maximize the social benefit from hearing appeals. We argue that in light of resource constraints, panel size should vary according to various factors. The higher the social benefit from correctly deciding the appeal, the larger the optimal panel size, all other things being equal. The larger the cost of increasing the panel size (including the opportunity cost of not being able to hear other cases), the lower the optimal panel size, all other things being equal. More controversially, the difficulty of making a correct determination has a mixed impact on optimal panel size. Both very hard and very easy cases do not benefit as much from adding judges to the panel as do cases of intermediate difficulty. We have found some evidence that in one institutional context, that of the Supreme Court of Canada, panel size accords at least partially with these considerations.
Panel size is but one of a set of interrelated factors that form the appellate structure in any given system. The most readily apparent factor that interacts with panel size is the manner in which cases come before the court. If the court has control over its own docket, it can control the cost of hearing appeals both through adjusting the size of the panel and through raising or lowering the bar for obtaining the opportunity to be heard. Clark and Strauss, for example, find that the ability of high courts to control their docket will in theory impact how the judges allocate resources across different types of cases. 43 Panel size and thresholds for appeal would appear to be mutually determined, with a lower threshold making it more difficult to maintain a larger panel size.
Relatedly, the nature of the court structure below the appellate court will be important.
The quality of the decisions by lower courts may impact the difficulty of the decision for the appellate body and therefore the optimal panel size, as higher quality lower courts may provide better information about the particular case. 44 Again, there are effects in both directions. For example, Shavell argues that the quality of the appellate decision (the ability of the appellate court to determine, at least on average, the socially optimal decision) and the likelihood of appeal both have an impact on the incentives of the lower courts. 45 He assumes that the lower court judge obtains some benefit from choosing a particular decision and therefore an appeal which is certain and likely to be socially optimal deters the judge from choosing her own preferred outcome.
46
Lower court quality therefore can affect both our assumptions about the independence of decisions (between levels of courts) as well as the cost of hearing decisions (if better lower court decisions make the appeal easier to decide).
Further, the judicial appointment process will be an important factor in how panel size is determined and functions within any system. As noted earlier, we have assumed that judges do not make decisions according to their personal political preferences. The applicability of this assumption to a particular system may depend on the how judges are appointed. To the extent judges are appointed on a partisan basis, this assumption seems more strained. For example, there is some evidence that ideological voting is more prevalent at the Supreme Court level in the US than in Canada, which may in part be a function of how Supreme Court judges are appointed 43 Clark and Strauss, supra note 9. 44 Clark and Strauss, supra note 9. 45 Steven Shavell, -The Appeals Process and Adjudicator Incentives‖ (2006) 35 Journal of Legal Studies 1. 46 As Shavell notes, there is some scope for altering decisions because the litigants must bear a cost of an appeal; as such, the adjudicator may still deviate from the socially optimal decision within the costs of appeal. Ibid, at 2.
in the two countries. 47 Further, our assumption that judges are in effect generalists such that all have equal probabilities of determining the correct result depends on how judges are appointed.
If judges are appointed because they are experts in particular issues, it may impact the optimal number of judges for different types of cases.
The number of judges hearing a case is an important instrument in the design of appellate courts. It is useful to isolate it in order to overcome the simple assumption that bigger is better when it comes to panel size. In the presence of some fairly strong assumptions about the institutional context and how judges make decisions, the choice of panel size will depend in part on the social benefit from a correct decision, the cost of a judge hearing an appeal and the difficulty of the decision. More work is needed, however, to determine optimal size when these constraints are relaxed.
47 Alarie and Green, supra note 16. 
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